本文是保罗格雷厄姆2009年的博文，这里提供中文译文和英文原文两个版本

译文

本译文转载自公众号文章：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/2xJgyGuqv5avGeUqMtG7cg
翻译自保罗·格雷厄姆的文章《Ramen Profitable》原文链接http://www.paulgraham.com/ramenprofitable.html。
翻译模型使用Claude-3.5-sonnet

2009年7月

现在"泡面盈利"（Ramen Profitable）这个词已经广为人知，我应该精确解释一下这个概念的含义。

泡面盈利意味着一家创业公司刚好赚到足够支付创始人生活开支的钱。这与创业公司传统上追求的盈利形式不同。传统盈利意味着一个大赌注终于开始回报，而泡面盈利的主要重要性在于它为你争取了时间。[1]

[1] "泡面盈利"中的"泡面"指的是方便面，这几乎是最便宜的食物。

请不要照字面理解这个词。生活在方便面上会非常不健康。大米和豆类是更好的食物来源。如果你没有的话，首先投资一个电饭煲。

过去，一家创业公司通常只有在筹集和花费相当多资金后才能盈利。一家生产计算机硬件的公司可能在5年内都无法盈利，期间他们可能花费了5000万美元。但当他们最终盈利时，年收入可能达到5000万美元。这种盈利意味着创业公司已经成功了。

泡面盈利是另一个极端：一家创业公司在2个月后就实现盈利，尽管月收入只有3000美元，因为唯一的员工是几个25岁的创始人，他们几乎不需要什么生活开支。每月3000美元的收入并不意味着公司已经成功。但它确实与传统意义上盈利的公司有一个共同点：他们不需要筹集资金就能生存。

泡面盈利对大多数人来说是一个陌生的概念，因为它直到最近才变得可行。对许多创业公司来说，这仍然不可行；例如，对大多数生物技术创业公司来说就不可能；但对许多软件创业公司来说却是可能的，因为它们现在的成本如此之低。对许多公司而言，唯一的真正成本就是创始人的生活开支。

这种盈利类型的主要意义在于你不再受制于投资者。如果你仍在亏损，那么最终你要么必须筹集更多资金，要么关闭公司。一旦你达到泡面盈利，这种痛苦的选择就消失了。你仍然可以筹集资金，但你不必现在就这么做。

不需要资金最明显的好处是你可以获得更好的条件。如果投资者知道你需要钱，他们有时会利用这一点。有些人甚至可能故意拖延，因为他们知道随着你的资金耗尽，你会变得越来越顺从。

但泡面盈利还有三个不太明显的优势。一个是它让你对投资者更有吸引力。如果你已经盈利，即使规模再小，也表明(a)你至少能让某些人付钱给你，(b)你认真地在构建人们想要的东西，以及(c)你有足够的纪律控制开支。

这让投资者感到放心，因为你已经解决了他们最大的三个担忧。他们常常资助那些有聪明创始人和巨大市场的公司，但这些公司仍然失败了。当这些公司失败时，通常是因为(a)人们不愿为他们制造的东西付费，例如因为销售太困难，或者市场还没准备好，(b)创始人解决了错误的问题，而不是关注用户需要什么，或者(c)公司花费太多，在开始盈利之前就烧光了资金。如果你达到泡面盈利，你就已经在避免这些错误了。

泡面盈利的另一个好处是它有利于士气。当你刚开始创业时，公司感觉相当理论化。它在法律上是一家公司，但当你称之为公司时，你感觉自己在撒谎。当人们开始向你支付可观的金额时，公司开始变得真实。而你自己的生活开支是你最能感受到的里程碑，因为在那时未来的状态发生了翻转。现在生存成为了默认状态，而不是死亡。

在创业公司中，这种规模的士气提升非常有价值，因为经营创业公司的精神压力是使其变得困难的原因。创业公司仍然非常罕见。为什么不更多人这样做？是因为财务风险吗？很多25岁的人根本不存钱。是因为长时间工作吗？很多人在普通工作中也工作同样长的时间。阻止人们创业的是对承担如此多责任的恐惧。这种恐惧并非不合理：它确实很难承受。任何能减轻你一些压力的事情都会大大增加你生存的机会。

达到泡面盈利的创业公司可能比不成功的几率更大。考虑到创业结果的双峰分布：要么失败，要么赚很多钱，这是相当令人兴奋的。

拉面盈利的第四个优势是最不明显的，但可能也是最重要的。如果你不需要融资，你就不必中断公司的工作去做融资。

融资是非常令人分心的。如果你的生产力能达到之前的三分之一，你就已经很幸运了。而且这种状态可能会持续数月。

直到今年年初，我才真正理解(或者说记起)为什么融资如此分散注意力。我注意到我们投资的初创公司在转向融资时通常会陷入停滞，但直到Y Combinator自己融资时我才确切地想起原因。我们的融资相对容易;我问的第一批人就同意了;但敲定细节花了几个月时间，在此期间我几乎没做什么实际工作。为什么?因为我一直在想着这件事。

在任何给定的时间，对一个初创公司来说通常都有一个最紧迫的问题。这就是你在晚上入睡时和早上洗澡时会思考的问题。当你开始融资时，这就成了你思考的问题。你早上只洗一次澡，如果在洗澡时你在想投资者的事，那你就没在想产品的事。

相反，如果你可以选择何时融资，你可以选择一个不在其他事情中间的时间，而且你可能还可以坚持要求融资快速完成。如果你不在乎融资是否成功，你甚至可能避免让融资占据你的思想。

拉面盈利的含义不超过其定义所暗示的。例如，它并不意味着你在"自力更生"地创业——即你永远不会从投资者那里拿钱。从经验来看，这似乎并不太可行。很少有初创公司在不接受投资的情况下成功。也许随着初创公司成本的降低，这种情况会变得更常见。另一方面，资金就在那里，等待被投资。如果初创公司对资金的需求减少，他们就能以更好的条件获得资金，这会使他们更倾向于接受资金。这将趋向于产生一种平衡。[2]

[2] 很有可能，从投资者向创始人转移权力实际上会增加风险投资业务的规模。我认为投资者目前对创始人的态度过于苛刻。如果他们被迫停止这种做法，整个风险投资行业将运作得更好，你可能会看到类似于取消限制性法律后贸易增长的情况。

投资者是创始人最大的痛苦来源之一；如果他们停止造成如此多的痛苦，成为创始人会更好；如果成为创始人更好，更多的人会去做。

拉面盈利还不意味着Joe Kraus的想法，即你应该在产品beta测试时就将商业模式也进行beta测试。他认为你应该从一开始就让人们付费。我认为这太局限了。Facebook没有这么做，而他们做得比大多数初创公司都好。对他们来说，立即赚钱不仅是不必要的，而且可能是有害的。不过，我确实认为Joe的规则对许多初创公司可能有用。当创始人看起来注意力不集中时，我有时会建议他们试着让客户为某些东西付费，希望这种约束能促使他们采取行动。

Joe的想法和拉面盈利的区别在于，一个拉面盈利的公司不必以最终的方式赚钱。它只需要赚钱就行。最著名的例子是Google，最初通过向Yahoo等网站授权搜索技术来赚钱。

拉面盈利有什么缺点吗？可能最大的危险是它可能把你变成一个咨询公司。初创公司必须是产品公司，即制作一个所有人都使用的单一产品。初创公司的定义特质是快速增长，而咨询业务就无法像产品那样扩展。[3]但通过咨询很容易每月赚到3000美元;事实上，这对合同编程来说是一个很低的价格。所以可能会有一种滑向咨询业务的诱惑，并告诉自己你们是一家拉面盈利的初创公司，而实际上你们根本不是一家初创公司。

[3] 可以想象，一家初创公司可能通过将咨询转变为可扩展的形式来实现增长。但如果他们这样做，他们实际上就是一家产品公司。

一开始做一些咨询类的工作是可以的。初创公司通常一开始都要做一些奇怪的事情。但要记住，拉面盈利不是目的地。一个初创公司的目的地是变得非常大;拉面盈利是一个在途中不死掉的技巧。

英文原文

Now that the term "ramen profitable" has become widespread, I ought to explain precisely what the idea entails.

Ramen profitable means a startup makes just enough to pay the founders' living expenses. This is a different form of profitability than startups have traditionally aimed for. Traditional profitability means a big bet is finally paying off, whereas the main importance of ramen profitability is that it buys you time. [1]

In the past, a startup would usually become profitable only after raising and spending quite a lot of money. A company making computer hardware might not become profitable for 5 years, during which they spent $50 million. But when they did they might have revenues of $50 million a year. This kind of profitability means the startup has succeeded.

Ramen profitability is the other extreme: a startup that becomes profitable after 2 months, even though its revenues are only $3000 a month, because the only employees are a couple 25 year old founders who can live on practically nothing. Revenues of $3000 a month do not mean the company has succeeded. But it does share something with the one that's profitable in the traditional way: they don't need to raise money to survive.

Ramen profitability is an unfamiliar idea to most people because it only recently became feasible. It's still not feasible for a lot of startups; it would not be for most biotech startups, for example; but it is for many software startups because they're now so cheap. For many, the only real cost is the founders' living expenses.

The main significance of this type of profitability is that you're no longer at the mercy of investors. If you're still losing money, then eventually you'll either have to raise more or shut down. Once you're ramen profitable this painful choice goes away. You can still raise money, but you don't have to do it now.

The most obvious advantage of not needing money is that you can get better terms. If investors know you need money, they'll sometimes take advantage of you. Some may even deliberately stall, because they know that as you run out of money you'll become increasingly pliable.

But there are also three less obvious advantages of ramen profitability. One is that it makes you more attractive to investors. If you're already profitable, on however small a scale, it shows that (a) you can get at least someone to pay you, (b) you're serious about building things people want, and (c) you're disciplined enough to keep expenses low.

This is reassuring to investors, because you've addressed three of their biggest worries. It's common for them to fund companies that have smart founders and a big market, and yet still fail. When these companies fail, it's usually because (a) people wouldn't pay for what they made, e.g. because it was too hard to sell to them, or the market wasn't ready yet, (b) the founders solved the wrong problem, instead of paying attention to what users needed, or (c) the company spent too much and burned through their funding before they started to make money. If you're ramen profitable, you're already avoiding these mistakes.

Another advantage of ramen profitability is that it's good for morale. A company tends to feel rather theoretical when you first start it. It's legally a company, but you feel like you're lying when you call it one. When people start to pay you significant amounts, the company starts to feel real. And your own living expenses are the milestone you feel most, because at that point the future flips state. Now survival is the default, instead of dying.

A morale boost on that scale is very valuable in a startup, because the moral weight of running a startup is what makes it hard. Startups are still very rare. Why don't more people do it? The financial risk? Plenty of 25 year olds save nothing anyway. The long hours? Plenty of people work just as long hours in regular jobs. What keeps people from starting startups is the fear of having so much responsibility. And this is not an irrational fear: it really is hard to bear. Anything that takes some of that weight off you will greatly increase your chances of surviving.

A startup that reaches ramen profitability may be more likely to succeed than not. Which is pretty exciting, considering the bimodal distribution of outcomes in startups: you either fail or make a lot of money.

The fourth advantage of ramen profitability is the least obvious but may be the most important. If you don't need to raise money, you don't have to interrupt working on the company to do it.

Raising money is terribly distracting. You're lucky if your productivity is a third of what it was before. And it can last for months.

I didn't understand (or rather, remember) precisely why raising money was so distracting till earlier this year. I'd noticed that startups we funded would usually grind to a halt when they switched to raising money, but I didn't remember exactly why till YC raised money itself. We had a comparatively easy time of it; the first people I asked said yes; but it took months to work out the details, and during that time I got hardly any real work done. Why? Because I thought about it all the time.

At any given time there tends to be one problem that's the most urgent for a startup. This is what you think about as you fall asleep at night and when you take a shower in the morning. And when you start raising money, that becomes the problem you think about. You only take one shower in the morning, and if you're thinking about investors during it, then you're not thinking about the product.

Whereas if you can choose when you raise money, you can pick a time when you're not in the middle of something else, and you can probably also insist that the round close fast. You may even be able to avoid having the round occupy your thoughts, if you don't care whether it closes.

Ramen profitable means no more than the definition implies. It does not, for example, imply that you're "bootstrapping" the startup—that you're never going to take money from investors. Empirically that doesn't seem to work very well. Few startups succeed without taking investment. Maybe as startups get cheaper it will become more common. On the other hand, the money is there, waiting to be invested. If startups need it less, they'll be able to get it on better terms, which will make them more inclined to take it. That will tend to produce an equilibrium. [2]

Another thing ramen profitability doesn't imply is Joe Kraus's idea that you should put your business model in beta when you put your product in beta. He believes you should get people to pay you from the beginning. I think that's too constraining. Facebook didn't, and they've done better than most startups. Making money right away was not only unnecessary for them, but probably would have been harmful. I do think Joe's rule could be useful for many startups, though. When founders seem unfocused, I sometimes suggest they try to get customers to pay them for something, in the hope that this constraint will prod them into action.

The difference between Joe's idea and ramen profitability is that a ramen profitable company doesn't have to be making money the way it ultimately will. It just has to be making money. The most famous example is Google, which initially made money by licensing search to sites like Yahoo.

Is there a downside to ramen profitability? Probably the biggest danger is that it might turn you into a consulting firm. Startups have to be product companies, in the sense of making a single thing that everyone uses. The defining quality of startups is that they grow fast, and consulting just can't scale the way a product can. [3] But it's pretty easy to make $3000 a month consulting; in fact, that would be a low rate for contract programming. So there could be a temptation to slide into consulting, and telling yourselves you're a ramen profitable startup, when in fact you're not a startup at all.

It's ok to do a little consulting-type work at first. Startups usually have to do something weird at first. But remember that ramen profitability is not the destination. A startup's destination is to grow really big; ramen profitability is a trick for not dying en route.

Notes

[1] The "ramen" in "ramen profitable" refers to instant ramen, which is just about the cheapest food available.
Please do not take the term literally. Living on instant ramen would be very unhealthy. Rice and beans are a better source of food. Start by investing in a rice cooker, if you don't have one.

[2] There's a good chance that a shift in power from investors to founders would actually increase the size of the venture business. I think investors currently err too far on the side of being harsh to founders. If they were forced to stop, the whole venture business would work better, and you might see something like the increase in trade you always see when restrictive laws are removed.
Investors are one of the biggest sources of pain for founders; if they stopped causing so much pain, it would be better to be a founder; and if it were better to be a founder, more people would do it.

[3] It's conceivable that a startup could grow big by transforming consulting into a form that would scale. But if they did that they'd really be a product company.